Aug 12 • 26M

Episode 10: Financial Crisis Redux, Part I

 
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Llewellyn Jones
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Financial Crisis Post-Mortem: Interest Rates Rather than Housing Bubble Drove Mortgage Crisis

Llewellyn Jones
·
April 16, 2020
Financial Crisis Post-Mortem: Interest Rates Rather than Housing Bubble Drove Mortgage Crisis

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Other stories in this series:

Investigative Economics
Financial Crisis Post-Mortem: TARP Mortgage Beneficiaries Were Largely Not Subprime
Read more
3 years ago · Llewellyn Jones
Investigative Economics
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Bought Flood of Refinancing Loans Pre-Crisis
The Government Sponsored Entities, or GSEs, responsible for buying mortgages and packaging them as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) are well known to have been at the center of the subprime mortgage crisis. The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, colloquially known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, …
Read more
3 years ago · Llewellyn Jones
Investigative Economics
Housing Crash Redux: Collateralized Debt Obligations Came Back And Nothing Happened
Supposedly, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were at the heart of the subprime mortgage crisis. Complex derivatives turned a medium-sized problem into a massive one. And it was various deregulatory maneuvers a few years prior, starting with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999, that enabled the world of financial derivatives to flourish…
Read more
6 months ago · Llewellyn Jones
Investigative Economics
Financial Crisis Post-Mortem: Delinquencies and TARP Funds Led to Regional Bank Mergers
Between major national banks, like Bank of America and Wells Fargo, and smaller community banks lie regional banks: banks that sometimes span multiple states with numerous locations but aren’t the size of national banks. Surrounding the subprime mortgage crisis, thousands and thousands of borrowers would fall delinquent on their loans and regional banks …
Read more
3 years ago · Llewellyn Jones
Investigative Economics
Glass-Steagall’s Relevance: The Deregulation that Drove the Financial Crisis
The story of the 2007-2008 financial crisis has left out the role of deregulation. In the wake of the crisis, financial experts dismissed the effect of eliminating banking regulations like Glass-Steagall in media outlets like NPR and the Financial Times since the law was mainly aimed at preventing banks from getting too large or “too big to fail,” which …
Read more
5 years ago · Llewellyn Jones
Investigative Economics
Indymac Redux: The Panic Before the Foreclosure Machine
When it was recently revealed that Cesar Sayoc—the person accused of sending bombs to George Soros, the Clintons, and others—had his home foreclosed by mortgage servicer Indymac/OneWest, the foreclosure crisis was back in the news for a brief moment…
Read more
5 years ago · Llewellyn Jones
Investigative Economics
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Bought Flood of Refinancing Loans Pre-Crisis
The Government Sponsored Entities, or GSEs, responsible for buying mortgages and packaging them as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) are well known to have been at the center of the subprime mortgage crisis. The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, colloquially known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, …
Read more
3 years ago · Llewellyn Jones
Investigative Economics
Federal Reserve Bought Up Asset-Backed Securities As China Sold Following Financial Crisis
Asset-backed securities, specifically mortgage-backed securities, were at the center of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. These were the investments created by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by pooling together mortgages and then selling slices or tranches of pooled mortgages to investors in the open markets…
Read more
2 years ago · 1 like · Llewellyn Jones

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